Social security reform in Latin America by Olivia S. Mitchell
1 This paper draws on research
described in Barreto and Mitchell
(forthcoming) and Mitchell and
Barreto (1997).








atin America has seen a great deal 
of political and economic upheaval
over the last hundred years.  What
happened in Chile in 1981, however, 
was a “quiet” revolution—one that dra-
matically changed the way people look 
at retirement programs around the world.  
In that year, the Chilean government pio-
neered the radical idea of completely over-
hauling the nation’s then-bankrupt nation-
al social security reform program, replac-
ing it with a privately managed, funded,
deﬁned-contribution pension system.
Today, more than 15 years later, the
Chilean pension fund “success story” 
has caught the attention of economists 
and policymakers everywhere.
To understand why Chile’s restructuring
of its social security system has caught the
attention of its Latin American neighbors—
and many other nations as well—it is useful
to begin by asking what that country did
and why.  Next we summarize what other
countries did, following in Chile’s footsteps.
Finally we offer a brief assessment of the
Latin model for social security reform.1
WHAT THE CHILEAN SOCIAL
REFORM ACCOMPLISHED
At the end of the 1970s, Chile’s old-
age retirement program was in disarray.
Many “cajas”—publicly managed pension
programs—were critically under-funded,
placing the government in the unenviable
position of either closing them down or
radically restructuring them.  In 1981, the
government decided to terminate these old
plans, instituting in their place a national
two-tiered social security system.  
Most widely discussed is the private
pension tier in this new system, known 
as the AFP plan (Association of Pension
Funds).  This structure mandates that every
(formal sector) worker pay 10 percent of
earnings into a privately administered
deﬁned-contribution pension plan.  System
taxes are collected by a pension sales force 
of more than 19,000 agents; individual
workers may designate a fund manager from
among approximately 20 state-licensed and
regulated fund managers who compete for
the privilege of managing workers’ invest-
ments.  AFP sales agents hence devote sub-
stantial effort to trying to get workers to
switch AFPs up to four times per year.  Less
well known, but also important, is the other
tier in the Chilean national system, which
takes the form of a government-supported
old-age beneﬁt promise.  This is a ﬂoor or
minimum beneﬁt, payable by the govern-
ment to workers whose private AFP pension
is too small to generate a minimum payout.  
Several ﬁnancing techniques were
needed to pay for the transition to this new
system.  The Chilean government was fortu-
nate to have a budget surplus worth about 5
percent of GDP.  In addition, beneﬁt entitle-
ments under the old plan were pared down,
in part by raising the retirement ages and
years of service required for full beneﬁts.
Finally, the government issued new debt in
the form of “Recognition Bonds” to workers
with accrued beneﬁt promises under the old
terminated system.  These bonds were esti-
mated at around 80 percent of GDP and will
be paid down over the next 45 years or so. 
Beneﬁt payouts at retirement are deter-
mined by workers’ accruals in their AFP
accounts.  These accumulations may be used
to purchase an annuity from an insurance
ﬁrm, or workers may take a “programmed
withdrawal” akin to the minimum distrib-
utions computed by the United States
Internal Revenue Service.  (A retiree with 
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a very large pension accrual might also be
allowed to take a partial lump sum.)  Should
the retiree’s beneﬁt payment be too low,
however, the government will instead
provide him with a guaranteed minimum
beneﬁt—worth about three-quarters of the
minimum wage, or one-quarter of the work-
er’s average pay during the decade prior to
retirement.  In that event, his AFP amount is
taxed 100 percent by the government.
One as-yet-unsettled issue is how large
this minimum guarantee promise will end
up being.  Some analysts have opined that
perhaps a majority of future retirees may be
owed this minimum payout if investment
performance and labor earnings fall below
current projections.  Others worry that the
promised minimum will prove to be too low
to sustain retirees in old age, but raising it
could reduce participants’ willingness to pay
into the deﬁned contribution system.
Another important aspect of the system
is its extensive supervisory and monitoring
superstructure: The Chilean government has
argued that it needs to control most aspects
of private pension operations to protect par-
ticipants.  For example, there is a cap on the
amount of equity that pension fund man-
agers may hold in their pension portfolios.
The managers also face severe penalties if
their rate of investment return diverges
markedly from the rates of other funds, 
and they are permitted to levy only certain
types of fees and commissions on investors.
Workers participating in the system may
move their money across pension funds
only a few times per year and may not 
diversify their pensions by holding shares 
in several funds at once.  The government 
also regulates the tax status of the pension
system; as in the United States, beneﬁts are




In the years since Chile reformed its
social security system, several other Latin
countries have devised their own social
security privatization efforts by adapting
the Chilean blueprint.  A recent study of
these reforms found that a Chilean-type
two-pillar design had recently been
adopted by Peru, Argentina, Colombia,
Uruguay, and Mexico, each implementing
a form of deﬁned-contribution pension
program but also including important
modiﬁcations (Mitchell and Barreto 1997).  
As in Chile, the ﬁrst pillar in these
other countries is a minimum beneﬁt 
guarantee, typically paid for, at least in 
part, from general revenue (see Table 1).
In each case, the second pillar tends to
include a deﬁned-contribution pension,
where the earnings-related contribution 
is tied to an investment account.  One 
difference across countries, however, is 
the relative size of the ﬁrst and second 
pillars.  For example, the ﬂoor beneﬁt is
set at around one-quarter of the average
wage in Argentina, but it is as high as 40
percent to 55 percent in Mexico.  
Another difference is that most of 
the countries following in Chile’s path
gave middle-aged workers the option to
choose between an ongoing government
pay-as-you-go plan and a funded, pri-
vately held, deﬁned-contribution pen-
sion.  This is a very different result from
that of the Chilean AFP system, inasmuch
as the Chilean system required all to join it
(after a very short phase-in period).  While
most nations also raised their normal (and
sometimes early) retirement ages as a part
of the national system overhaul, in many
countries workers are still able to quit
work at young ages because of generous
early retirement and disability retirement
beneﬁts, sometimes at actuarially
subsidized rates.  
A FRAMEWORK FOR  
EVALUATION
The growth of these new systems all
over Latin America has produced calls for
formal evaluation of the programs, though
it should be kept in mind that “success”
cannot be measured until an entire genera-
tion of workers moves through, and then
retires from, the system.  On the other
hand, analysts lack the luxury of being
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NOTES: Derived from Barreto and Mitchell (forthcoming).  na signiﬁes not available.  ProgWD signiﬁes programmed withdrawal.  
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systems are constantly being tinkered 
with through time.  Thus the evaluation
process is inherently dynamic, like the
institutions themselves.  
Some initial observations may be
noted, in any event.  For one thing, AFP
accounts have grown rapidly in Latin
America over the last decade, particu-
larly in Chile and Argentina.  While
smaller asset accumulations have been
seen in Peru, Colombia, Uruguay, and
Mexico, these programs are also much
newer.  Investment performance has been
variable, with a decade of high returns in
Chile followed by two years of negative real
rates that spurred calls for liberalized invest-
ment management.  In Chile in particular,
experts have not explained why so few of
the funds are invested internationally (under
1 percent of assets), particularly since port-
folio diversiﬁcation could reduce retirees’
exposure to country risk.  Analysts also
complain about the apparently high admin-
istrative costs of these programs, which is
probably attributable to the small scale of
the programs and the regulatory overhead
under which they operate (Mitchell 1996).
Still to be confronted are concerns
that, even after reform, these Latin Amer-
ican countries still have extremely high
social security payroll taxes (see Table 1)
and  hence strong disincentives for workers
to participate in the formal labor market.  
Also troubling is the fact that reforms in the
insurance business and banking system are
typically required to strengthen a privately
managed retirement system’s credibility
(Mitchell 1997).  Building an environment
supportive of private pensions requires more
than just pension reform.
CONCLUSIONS  
Chile’s adoption of the AFP private 
pension system paved the way for social
security reforms undertaken throughout
Latin America in the last decade.  This
reform process has not been a uniform
one, however, as each country has had 
to develop its own ﬁnancing and beneﬁt
designs while building a regulatory struc-
ture needed to foster conﬁdence in its
national retirement system.  By replacing
bankrupt and unsustainable retirement
plans, this reform process has brought
increased conﬁdence to an aging Latin
American workforce worried about retire-
ment prospects.  Nevertheless, it is certain
that continued reforms will be required 
as demographic, economic, and political
realities evolve.
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